[References] “Libertarianism” without qualifiers

Peter Vallentyne (2007). LIBERTARIANISM AND THE STATE. Social Philosophy and Policy, 24, pp 187-205 doi:10.1017/S0265052507070082 http://journals.cambridge.org.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/action/displayAbstract?aid=611248


Although Robert Nozick has argued that libertarianism is compatible with the justice of a minimal state—even if does not arise from mutual consent—few have been persuaded. I will outline a different way of establishing that a non-consensual libertarian state can be just. I will show that a state can—with a few important qualifications—justly enforce the rights of citizens, extract payments to cover the costs of such enforcement, redistribute resources to the poor, and invest in infrastructure to overcome market failures.

Laurent Dobuzinskis (2004). Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 37, pp 1053-1055 doi:10.1017/S000842390441021X http://journals.cambridge.org.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/action/displayAbstract?aid=328065

Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams, eds., London: Palgrave, 2003, pp. x, 223

Philippe Van Parijs’ Real Freedom for All (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) is one of the most stimulating contributions to left-libertarianism published in the last decade. It is, therefore, not surprising that an edited volume that critically examines his ideas has now been published. The contributing authors (two of whom, Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner, are other well known left-libertarians) raise interesting and often pointed questions, but they all have some good things to say about Van Parijs’ original proposal.

Evan Charney (2004). Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty and Libertarianism Without Inequality. Perspectives on Politics, 2, pp 564-566 doi:10.1017/S1537592704220370 http://journals.cambridge.org.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/action/displayAbstract?aid=246624 In Libertarianism Without Inequality, Michael Otsuka seeks to combine a libertarian principle of the right of self-ownershipwith a robust commitment to egalitarianism. He does this in two ways: First, he argues, against Robert Nozick, that all schemes of redistributive taxation are not on a par with forced labor. Something like a “luxury income tax” for redistributive purposes, Otsuka argues, cannot be considered as equivalent to forced labor since it is easy to avoid; that is, persons can forgo the extra income that amounts to a “luxury.” Second, he denies that one’s right of ownership over worldly resources that one uses for income is as full as one’s right of ownership over oneself: Persons can acquire unowned worldly resources only if they leave enough so that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned resources, where “equally” advantageous means that one can derive the same degree of welfare from it. Furthermore, he claims that persons possess only a “lifetime leasehold” on worldly resources, which lapse into a state of nonownership upon death.

Libertarianism Without Inequality. By Michael Otsuka. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 168p. $39.95.

Libertarianism without inequality. Author: SREENIVASAN, GOPAL Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 74, Number 3, May 2007 , pp. 792-796(5)

Distributive Lessons from Division of Labour Author: Dietsch, Peter Source: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 5, Number 1, 2008 , pp. 96-117(22) Abstract: In their justification of individual entitlements, libertarians appeal to the concept of self-ownership. This paper argues that taking into account the division of labour in society calls for a fundamental reassessment of the normative implications of self-ownership. How should the benefits from division of labour—in other words, how should the co-operative surplus—be distributed? On the assumption that the parties to the division of labour are interdependent, and that this interdependence is mutual and of the same degree, I argue for an equal distribution of the co-operative surplus. In form, my argument bears similarities to the left-libertarian position that calls for an equal distribution of natural resources. Despite its radically egalitarian implications, an equal distribution of the co-operative surplus remains a libertarian principle.



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